New Measures Cover Cargo
Inspections,
Prohibitions on Aviation
Fuel, Rare Minerals
The Security Council today condemned in the strongest terms the
nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 6
January 2016 “in violation and flagrant disregard” of the relevant resolutions,
its actions thereby constituting a challenge to the Treaty on Non_Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to peace and stability in the region and beyond.
Unanimously adopting resolution 2270 (2016), the 15-member Council
also condemned the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launch of 7 February
2016, using ballistic missile technology, and demanded that it comply
immediately with its international obligations. Its previous actions on
the subject included the adoption of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013) and 2094 (2013).
By today’s resolution, the Council decided that all States should
inspect cargo within or transiting through their territory — including
airports, sea ports and free trade zones — that was destined for or originating
from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It also decided that
Member States should prohibit that country’s nationals and those in their own
territories from leasing or chartering their flagged vessels and aircraft to
it, or providing it with crew services. The prohibition should apply also
to any designated individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions
or violation of all related resolutions.
The Council also decided that all States should prohibit their own
nationals and others subject to their jurisdiction, as well as entities
incorporated in their respective territories from registering vessels in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and obtaining authorization for vessels
to use their respective flag. In addition, it decided that all States
should deny permission for any aircraft to take off from, land at or overfly
their respective territories if such aircraft contained items for supply, sale,
transfer or export of which were prohibited by all related resolutions, except
in cases of emergency landing.
Further by the text, the Council decided that Pyongyang should not
supply, sell or transfer coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium
ore, and rare earth minerals, and that all States should prohibit their
nationals from procuring such materials. By other terms, it decided that
all States should prevent the sale or supply of aviation fuel — including
aviation gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, and
kerosene-type rocket fuel — whether or not originating in their own territory,
to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
By other terms, the Council decided that Member States should
expel Pyongyang’s diplomats, governmental representatives or nationals acting
in a governmental capacity who assisted in the evasion of sanctions or the
violation of related resolutions. It decided further that all Member
States should prevent specialized teaching or training of Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea nationals within their territories, or by their nationals, in
disciplines that could contribute to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.
Speaking after the adoption, the representative of the United
States said the resolution went further than any other sanctions regime in two
decades, emphasizing that multilateral pressure could be effective in bringing
Pyongyang back to the table for serious and credible negotiations on
denuclearization. Describing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as
the only State that had conducted nuclear tests in the twenty-first century,
routinely threatening other countries with nuclear annihilation, she noted that
the chronic suffering of its people was the direct result of the choices made
by their Government.
Echoing that sentiment, the Republic of Korea’s representative
warned that a nuclear-armed Pyongyang would impair the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime and trigger an arms race in the
region. Deploring the use of scarce resources for weapons development
while citizens lived in abject poverty, he expressed hope that the resolution
would help to alleviate the population’s plight.
The United Kingdom’s representative noted that the resolution
contained some of the toughest measures ever taken by the Council, while
emphasizing that it was not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences,
nor to affect those activities not prohibited by Council resolutions, nor to
affect international relief efforts. New provisions on cargo inspection
were consistent with obligations set out in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, he added.
China’s representative stressed that the resolution should be a
starting point to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, emphasizing that
progress on the ground would depend on resuming peace talks and advancing
denuclearization. Concurring, the Russian Federation’s representative
described the new sanctions as “quite harsh” but necessary for resumption of
the six-party process and for Pyongyang’s return to the negotiating table.
Also speaking today were representatives of Japan, France, Spain,
Venezuela, Malaysia, New Zealand, Ukraine, Egypt, Senegal, Uruguay and Angola.
The meeting began at 10:10 a.m. and ended at 11:26 a.m.
Statements
SAMANTHA POWER (United States) said the chronic suffering
of the people in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was the direct
result of the choices made by the country’s Government, which had been spending
tremendous resources to build intercontinental ballistic missiles that could
strike most of the countries on the Council. “It would rather grow its
nuclear weapons programme than its own children,” she added. It was the
only State that had conducted nuclear tests in the twenty-first century and the
only Member State that had routinely threatened other countries with nuclear
annihilation. Noting that the new resolution went further than any other
sanctions regime in two decades, she emphasized that its purpose was not to
inflict greater hardship on the country’s people. The United States had
repeatedly urged the Council to address human rights violations, she recalled,
stressing that while there should be no illusion that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea would now abruptly halt its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
multilateral pressure could be effective in bringing Pyongyang back to the
table for serious and credible negotiations on denuclearization.
MOTOHIDE YOSHIKAWA (Japan) said the message to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was from the international community as a
whole, calling upon Member States to fulfil their obligations. In that
regard, the Chair of the 1718 Committee should arrange an open briefing to
go through the provisions of the new resolution with all Member States, he
said. Depending on the behaviour and attitude of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, the Security Council was prepared to suspend or lift
sanctions, which were not meant to target ordinary citizens. Welcoming
the resolution’s stronger emphasis on humanitarian and human rights concerns,
including abductions, he emphasized that it was essential that the Council
remain seized of the situation in all relevant aspects.
FRANÇOIS DELATTRE (France) said the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea had defied international law by conducting nuclear tests and
using ballistic missile technology, undermined the non-proliferation regime,
and violated resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094
(2013). In that context, Council members had been compelled to react
decisively and adopt the resolution, sending a unanimous message to
Pyongyang. The ultimate goal was to achieve denuclearization and restore
peace and security to the Korean Peninsula, he stressed.
LIU JIEYI (China) recalled that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea had conducted a nuclear test on 6 January 2016, in violation
of the relevant Council resolutions. As a close neighbour, China had
always supported efforts to resolve that complex crisis through peaceful means.
In that regard, the resolution should be a starting point to ease the
tension on the Korean Peninsula, he said, emphasizing that progress on the
ground would depend on resuming peace talks and advancing denuclearization.
VITALY I. CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said the sanctions
imposed by the resolution were quite harsh, but they left the door open to a
resumption of the six-party process. The idea was to ensure a return to
the negotiating table. Negative trends had been seen in north-east Asia
and it was a matter of concern that Pyongyang’s actions were being used to justify
enhancing weapons systems such as THAAD missiles. The hasty imposition of
unilateral sanctions that could have negative humanitarian consequences was
also a concern. He called upon all those participating in the six-party
talks to resume negotiations, saying the Russian Federation would support the
talks.
MATTHEW RYCROFT (United Kingdom) noted that the resolution
contained some of the toughest measures ever taken by the Council, adding that
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had to be deterred from pursing
illegal actions. However, the resolution was not intended to have adverse
humanitarian consequences, nor to affect those activities not prohibited by
Council resolutions, nor to affect international relief efforts, he emphasized,
pointing out that the new provisions on cargo inspection were consistent with
obligations set out in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Encouraging all States to implement the new resolution’s provisions in full, he
urged Pyongyang to return to credible and authentic multilateral talks and
permit full access by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.
RAMLAN BIN IBRAHIM (Malaysia) said he would have preferred
ample time to consider the text so as to avoid being presented with a fait
accompli. Emphasizing that the illicit development and procurement of
weapons of mass destruction and related technologies by any State could not be
tolerated, he said it was for that reason that he had voted in favour of the
resolution. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should resume
peaceful negotiations under the six-party talks framework, so that the Korean
Peninsula could benefit from greater predictability of inter-State behaviour
through greater engagement. “It requires a change of attitude and
embracing more trust” to resolve outstanding issues, he said, expressing his
delegation’s support for the resolution’s language on safeguarding humanitarian
exemptions, a crucial element that would prevent possible unintended
consequences against legitimate interests.
CAROLYN SCHWALGER (New Zealand) described Pyongyang’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons as among the most serious threats to the
international non-proliferation regime. Its actions defied international
law and Council resolutions alike, she said, noting that New Zealand had
co-sponsored today’s resolution “with a heavy heart”, hoping that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would choose a path that met its
citizens’ basic needs. The measures outlined in the text sent a clear
message that the country would not benefit from its provocative behaviour and
that the best path forward was a return to negotiations on denuclearizing the
Korean Peninsula, she said.
VOLODYMYR YELCHENKO (Ukraine) commended the efforts of the
United States and China in drafting and tabling the resolution. Noting
that expert-level meetings conducted by the United States delegation had given
Member States the opportunity to raise questions, he said the text was a
comprehensive and balanced document that strengthened the sanctions regime, reflecting
the findings of the 1872 Committee’s Panel of Experts. Today’s collective
decision was an historic step that emphasized the Council’s firm stance on
countering any threat to non-proliferation, he said.
AMR ABDELLATIF ABOULATTA (Egypt) said the resolution
reflected a message from the Council that it would not accept recent actions by
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that violated Council resolutions and
undermined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was a balanced
formula that took into consideration the resumption of the six-party talks and
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula without aggravating the humanitarian
situation. It marked a step on the long road to prevent the thwarting of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, he said, pointing out that in the Middle
East, one State remained outside that instrument. Today’s action in
adopting the resolution was an opportunity to remind the international
community of that fact, he added.
GORGUI CISS (Senegal), calling for the total prohibition of
nuclear testing and launching of ballistic missiles, welcomed the resolution’s
unanimous adoption, saying that the recent activities undertaken by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea threated international peace and
security. Expressing regret that previous sanctions had not prevented
Pyongyang from advancing its nuclear programme, he emphasized that all goods
headed to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must be inspected to exert
pressure on Pyongyang. However, sanctions were not a goal in themselves,
but a way to maintain peace and security, he stressed.
ELBIO ROSSELLI (Uruguay) said he would not repeat the
comments made by his colleagues, and called for the strict application of the
resolution, stressing that it should not have a negative impact on the delivery
of humanitarian assistance.
ISMAEL ABRAÃO GASPAR MARTINS (Angola), Council President
for March, spoke in his national capacity, saying that with the resolution, the
Council was sending a clear signal of the international community’s outright
rejection of nuclear proliferation. The text sought to strike a balance
by strengthening sanctions without punishing the people of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, while also creating a window of opportunity for
negotiations to resume. He called upon Pyongyang to negotiate a solution
within the agreed framework, with a view to ending its violations and reaping
all the benefits of being a rightful member of the international community.
OH JOON (Republic of Korea) said Pyongyang’s latest nuclear
test and long-range missile launch were grave violations of Security Council
resolutions and posed a clear threat to international peace and security.
A nuclear-armed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would impair the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime and trigger an arms
race in the region, he said, emphasizing that the international community must
act quickly and decisively. The resolution tabled today introduced some
of the most robust sanctions in the history of the United Nations, he noted,
adding that, when fully implemented, the measures would impede Pyongyang’s
activities relating to weapons of mass destruction. Deploring the use of
scarce resources for weapons development while citizens lived in abject
poverty, he stressed that the new sanctions targeted the regime and not the
population, expressing hope that the resolution would help to alleviate their
plight.
Resolution
The full text of resolution 2270 (2016) reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,
including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution 1695
(2006), resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), resolution 1887
(2009), resolution 2087 (2013) and resolution 2094 (2013), as well as the
statements of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009
(S/PRST/2009/7) and 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),
“Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a
threat to international peace and security,
“Expressing gravest concern at the nuclear test
conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 6
January 2016 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013)
and 2094 (2013), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts
aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and
beyond,
“Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK
respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international
community,
“Underlining also that measures imposed by this
resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the
civilian population DPRK,
“Regretting the DPRK’s diversion of financial,
technical and industrial resources toward developing its nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile program, and condemning its declared intent
to develop nuclear weapons,
“Expressing deep concern at the grave hardship that
the DPRK people are subjected to,
“Expressing great concern that the DPRK’s arms sales
have generated revenues that are diverted to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles while DPRK citizens have great unmet needs,
“Expressing serious concern that the DPRK has
continued to violate relevant Security Council resolutions through repeated
launches of ballistic missiles in 2014 and 2015, as well as the
submarine-launched ballistic missile ejection test in 2015 and noting that
all such ballistic missile activities contribute to the DPRK’s development of
nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,
“Expressing continued concern that the DPRK is abusing
the privileges and immunities accorded under the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatic and Consular Relations,
“Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK’s
ongoing nuclear-, and ballistic missile-related activities have further
generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that
there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,
“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,
“1. Condemns in the strongest terms
the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 6 January 2016 in violation and
flagrant disregard of the Council’s relevant resolutions, and further condemns the
DPRK’s launch of 7 February 2016, which used ballistic missile technology and
was in serious violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), and 2094 (2013);
“2. Reaffirms its decisions that the
DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile
technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation, and shall suspend all
activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context
re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches,
and demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with these
obligations;
“3. Reaffirms its decisions that the
DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a
complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related
activities;
“4. Reaffirms its decision that the
DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;
“5. Reaffirms that, pursuant to
paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006), all Member States shall prevent any
transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the
DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice,
services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or
use of nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass
destruction-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology,
and underscores that this provision prohibits the DPRK from
engaging in any form of technical cooperation with other Member States on
launches using ballistic missile technology, even if characterized as a
satellite launch or space launch vehicle;
“6. Decides that the measures in
paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and
related materiel, including small arms and light weapons and their related
materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice,
services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or
use of such arms and related materiel;
“7. Affirms that the obligations
imposed in paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006), as
extended by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1874 (2009), apply with respect
to the shipment of items to or from the DPRK for repair, servicing, refurbishing,
testing, reverse-engineering, and marketing, regardless of whether ownership or
control is transferred, and underscores that the measures
specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any
individual traveling for the purposes of carrying out the activities described
in this paragraph;
“8. Decides that the measures imposed
in paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any
item, except food or medicine, if the State determines that such item could
directly contribute to the development of the DPRK’s operational capabilities
of its armed forces, or to exports that support or enhance the operational
capabilities of armed forces of another Member State outside the DPRK,
and decides also that this provision shall cease to apply to
the supply, sale or transfer of an item, or its procurement, if:
(a) the State determines that such activity is
exclusively for humanitarian purposes or exclusively for livelihood purposes
which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue, and
also not related to any activity prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, provided that the State
notifies the Committee in advance of such determination and also informs the
Committee of measures taken to prevent the diversion of the item for such other
purposes, or
(b) the Committee has determined on a case-by-case
basis that a particular supply, sale or transfer would not be contrary to the
objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or
this resolution;
“9. Recalls that paragraph 9 of
resolution 1874 (2009) requires States to prohibit the procurement from the
DPRK of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the
provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related materiel,
and clarifies that this paragraph prohibits States from
engaging in the hosting of trainers, advisors, or other officials for the
purpose of military-, paramilitary- or police-related training;
“10. Decides that the measures specified in
paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals
and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals
or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned
or controlled by them, including through illicit means;
“11. Decides that the measures specified in
paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals
listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf
or at their direction;
“12. Affirms that “economic resources,” as
referred to in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), includes assets of
every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, actual or
potential, which potentially may be used to obtain funds, goods, or services,
such as vessels (including maritime vessels);
“13. Decides that if a Member State
determines that a DPRK diplomat, governmental representative, or other DPRK
national acting in a governmental capacity, is working on behalf or at the
direction of a designated individual or entity, or of an individual or entities
assisting in the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this
resolution, then the Member State shall expel the individual from its territory
for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national
and international law, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede the
transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations
Headquarters or other UN facilities to conduct United Nations business,
and decides that the provisions of this paragraph shall not
apply with respect to a particular individual if: a) the presence of the
individual is required for fulfillment of a judicial process, b) the
presence of the individual is required exclusively for medical, safety or other
humanitarian purposes, or c) the Committee has determined on a
case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to
the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013) and this resolution;
“14. Decides that, if a Member State
determines that an individual who is not a national of that State is working on
behalf of or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or assisting
the evasion of sanctions or violating the provisions of resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, then Member
States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of
repatriation to the individual’s state of nationality, consistent with
applicable national and international law, unless the presence of the individual
is required for fulfillment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical,
safety or other humanitarian purposes, or the Committee has determined on a
case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to
the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013) or this resolution, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall impede
the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United
Nations Headquarters or other UN facilities to conduct United Nations business;
“15. Underscores that, as a consequence of
implementing the obligations imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718
(2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), all Member States
shall close the representative offices of designated entities and prohibit such
entities, as well as individuals or entities acting for or on their behalf,
directly or indirectly, from participating in joint ventures or any other
business arrangements, and underscores that if a representative
of such an office is a DPRK national, then States are required to expel the
individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK
consistent with applicable national and international law, pursuant to and
consistent with paragraph 10 of resolution 2094 (2013);
“16. Notes that the DPRK frequently uses
front companies, shell companies, joint ventures and complex, opaque ownership
structures for the purpose of violating measures imposed in relevant Security
Council resolutions, and, in this regard, directs the
Committee, with the support of the Panel, to identify individuals and entities
engaging in such practices and, if appropriate, designate them to be subject to
the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013),
2094 (2013) and this resolution;
“17. Decides that all Member States shall
prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their
territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the
DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics,
advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial
navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical
engineering and related disciplines;
“18. Decides that all States shall inspect
the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including in their
airports, seaports and free trade zones, that has originated in the DPRK, or that
is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or
its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their
direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated
individuals or entities, or that is being transported on DPRK flagged aircraft
or maritime vessels, for the purposes of ensuring that no items are transferred
in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013)
and this resolution, and calls upon States to implement such inspections in a
manner that minimizes the impact on the transfer of cargo that the State
determines is for humanitarian purposes;
“19. Decides that Member States shall
prohibit their nationals and those in their territories from leasing or
chartering their flagged vessels or aircraft or providing crew services to the
DPRK, and decides that this prohibition shall also apply with
respect to any designated individuals or entities, any other DPRK entities, any
other individuals or entities whom the State determines to have assisted in the
evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006),
1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, any individuals or
entities acting on behalf or at the direction of any of the aforementioned, and
any entities owned or controlled by any of the aforementioned, calls
upon Member States to de‑register any vessel that is owned, operated
or crewed by the DPRK, further calls upon Member States not to
register any such vessel that is de-registered by another Member State pursuant
to this paragraph, and decides that this provision shall not
apply with respect to such leasing, chartering or provision of crew services
notified to the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis accompanied by:
a) information demonstrating that such activities are exclusively for
livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to
generate revenue, and b) information on measures taken to prevent such
activities from contributing to violations of the aforementioned resolutions;
“20. Decides that all States shall prohibit
their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities
incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from
registering vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use
the DPRK flag, and from owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel
classification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel
flagged by the DPRK, and decides that this measure shall not
apply to activities notified in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case
basis, following provision to the Committee of detailed information on the
activities, including the names of individuals and entities involved in them,
information demonstrating that such activities are exclusively for livelihood
purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate
revenue and on measures taken to prevent such activities from contributing to
violations of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or
this resolution;
“21. Decides that all States shall deny
permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly, unless under
the condition of landing for inspection, their territory, if they have
information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft
contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this
resolution, except in the case of an emergency landing, and calls upon all
States, when considering whether to grant overflight permission to flights to
assess known risk factors;
“22. Decides that all Member States shall
prohibit the entry into their ports of any vessel if the Member State has information
that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by a designated individual or entity, or contains cargo
the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, unless
entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port
of origination, or for inspection, or unless the Committee determines in
advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other
purposes consistent with the objectives of this resolution;
“23. Recalls that the Committee has
designated the DPRK firm Ocean Maritime Management (OMM), notes that
the vessels specified in Annex III of this resolution are economic resources
controlled or operated by OMM and therefore subject to the asset freeze imposed
in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), and underscores that
Member States are required to implement the relevant provisions of that
resolution;
“24. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon
all chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related programs, and shall act
strictly in accordance with its obligations as a State Party to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, or Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, and calls
upon the DPRK to accede to the Convention of the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their
Destruction, and then to immediately comply with its provisions;
“25. Decides to adjust the measures imposed
by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution through the
designation of additional goods, directs the Committee to
undertake its tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within
fifteen days of adoption of this resolution, and further decides that,
if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action
to adjust the measures within seven days of receiving that report;
“26. Directs the Committee to review and
update the items contained in S/2006/853/CORR.1 no later than sixty days from
the adoption of this resolution and on an annual basis thereafter;
“27. Decides that the measures imposed in
paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to any
item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK’s
nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other weapons of mass destruction
programs, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed
by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this
resolution;
“28. Reaffirms paragraphs 14 through 16 of
resolution 1874 (2009), and paragraph 8 of resolution 2087 (2013), and decides that
these paragraphs shall apply also with respect to any items the supply, sale or
transfer of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution identified in inspections conducted
pursuant to paragraph 18 of this resolution;
“29. Decides that the DPRK shall not
supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its
nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and
that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK
by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not
originating in the territory of the DPRK, and decides that
this provision shall not apply with respect to:
(a) Coal that the procuring State confirms on the
basis of credible information has originated outside the DPRK and was
transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason),
provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance and such transactions
are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile
programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution; and,
(b) Transactions that are determined to be exclusively
for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK’s
nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this
resolution;
“30. Decides that the DPRK shall not
supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its
nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, gold, titanium ore, vanadium
ore, and rare earth minerals, and that all States shall prohibit the
procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their
flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of
the DPRK;
“31. Decides that all States shall prevent
the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their
flag vessels or aircraft, of aviation fuel, including aviation gasoline,
naptha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, and kerosene-type rocket fuel,
whether or not originating in their territory, to the territory of the DPRK, or
unless the Committee has approved in advance on an exceptional case-by-case
basis the transfer to the DPRK of such products for verified essential
humanitarian needs, subject to specified arrangements for effective monitoring
of delivery and use, and decides also that this provision
shall not apply with respect to the sale or supply of aviation fuel to civilian
passenger aircraft outside the DPRK exclusively for consumption during its
flight to the DPRK and its return flight;
“32. Decides that the asset freeze imposed
by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to all the funds,
other financial assets and economic resources outside of the DPRK that are
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by entities of the Government of
the DPRK or the Worker’s Party of Korea, or by individuals or entities acting
on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by
them, that the State determines are associated with the DPRK’s nuclear or
ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, decides further
that all States except the DPRK shall ensure that any funds, financial assets
or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their
nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for
the benefit of such individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting
on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them,
and decides that these measures shall not apply with respect
to funds, other financial assets and economic resources that are required to
carry out activities of the DPRK’s missions to the United Nations and its
specialized agencies and related organizations or other diplomatic and consular
missions of the DPRK, and to any funds, other financial assets and economic
resources that the Committee determines in advance on a case-by-case basis are
required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any
other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;
“33. Decides that States shall prohibit in
their territories the opening and operation of new branches, subsidiaries, and
representative offices of DPRK banks, decides further that
States shall prohibit financial institutions within their territories or
subject to their jurisdiction from establishing new joint ventures and from
taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent
relationships with DPRK banks, unless such transactions have been approved by
the Committee in advance, and decides that States shall take
the necessary measures to close such existing branches, subsidiaries and
representative offices, and also to terminate such joint ventures, ownership
interests and correspondent banking relationships with DPRK banks within ninety
days from the adoption of this resolution;
“34. Decides that States shall prohibit
financial institutions within their territories or subject to their
jurisdiction from opening new representative offices or subsidiaries, branches
or banking accounts in the DPRK;
“35. Decides that States shall take the
necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or
banking accounts in the DPRK within ninety days, if the State concerned has
credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such
financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile
programs, or other activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, and decides further
that this provision shall not apply if the Committee determines on a
case-by-case basis that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for
the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic
missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related
organizations, or for any other purposes consistent with resolutions
1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution;
“36. Decides that all States shall prohibit
public and private financial support from within their territories or by
persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK
(including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their
nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support
could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other
activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013) or this resolution, including paragraph 8;
“37. Expresses concern that transfers to
the DPRK of gold may be used to evade the measures imposed in resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this resolution, and clarifies that
all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution
2094 (2013) to the transfers of gold, including through gold couriers,
transiting to and from the DPRK so as to ensure such transfers of gold do not
contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, or other
activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013),
2094 (2013) or this resolution, or to the evasion of measures imposed by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this
resolution;
“38. Recalls that the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) has called upon countries to apply enhanced due diligence and
effective countermeasure to protect their jurisdictions from the DPRK’s illicit
financial activity, and calls upon Member States to apply the
FATF Recommendation 7, its Interpretive Note, and related guidance to
effectively implement targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation;
“39. Reaffirms the measures imposed in
paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding luxury goods,
and clarifies that the term “luxury goods” includes, but is
not limited to, the items specified in Annex V of this resolution;
“40. Calls upon all States to report to the
Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and
thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken
in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, requests the
Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), in cooperation
with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist
States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner, and directs the
Committee to prioritize outreach to those Member States who have never
submitted implementation reports as requested by the Security Council;
“41. Calls upon all States to supply
information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures
imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or
this resolution;
“42. Encourages all States to examine the
circumstances of previously reported sanctions violations, particularly the
items seized or activities prevented pursuant to the relevant resolutions, so
as to assist in ensuring full and appropriate implementation of these
resolutions, especially paragraph 27 of this resolution, and notes in
this regard the reporting of the Panel of Experts and the information regarding
sanctions violations that the Committee has released publicly;
“43. Directs the Committee to respond
effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1718 (2006),
1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution, and, in this
regard, directs the Committee to designate additional
individuals and entities to be subject to the measures imposed in resolutions
1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this resolution;
“44. Directs the Committee to continue its
efforts to assist Member States in implementing the measures imposed on the
DPRK, and, in this regard, requests the Committee to draft and
circulate a comprehensive compilation of all the measures imposed in
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), and this
resolution so as to facilitate Member State implementation;
“45. Directs the Committee to update the
information contained on the Committee’s list of individuals and entities,
including new aliases and front companies, and directs the
Committee to complete this task within 45 days of the adoption of this
resolution and every twelve months thereafter;
“46. Decides that the mandate of the
Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply
with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013) and
this resolution;
“47. Emphasizes the importance of all
States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no
claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the
DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this
resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such
person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where
its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this
resolution or previous resolutions;
“48. Underlines that measures imposed by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and this
resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the
civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities,
including economic activities and cooperation, that are not prohibited by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or this
resolution, and the work of international organizations and non‑governmental
organization carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the
benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK;
“49. Reiterates the importance of
maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia
at large, and expresses its commitment to a peaceful,
diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by
Council members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and
comprehensive solution through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that
might aggravate tensions;
“50. Reaffirms its support to the Six Party
Talks, calls for their resumption, and reiterates its
support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of
19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the
Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a
peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each
other’s sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties
undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments;
“51. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK’s
actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend
or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK’s compliance, and,
in this regard, expresses its determination to take further
significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch;
“52. Decides to remain seized of the
matter.”
Annex I
Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)
1.
CHOE CHUN-SIK
a. Description:
Choe Chun-sik was the director of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences (SANS)
and was the head of the DPRK’s long-range missile program.
b. AKA:
Choe Chun Sik; Ch’oe Ch’un Sik
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 12 October 1954; Nationality: DPRK
2.
CHOE SONG IL
a. Description:
Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Vietnam
b. AKA:
NA
c. Identifiers:
Passport: 472320665; Passport Date of Expiration: 26 Sep 2017; Passport:
563120356; Nationality: DPRK
3.
HYON KWANG IL
a. Description:
Hyon Kwang Il is the Department Director for Scientific Development at the
National Aerospace Development Administration.
b. AKA:
Hyon Gwang Il
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 27 May 1961; Nationality: DPRK
4.
JANG BOM SU
a. Description:
Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria
b. AKA:
Jang Pom Su
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 15 April 1957; Nationality: DPRK
5.
JANG YONG SON
a. Description:
Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) Representative in Iran
b. AKA:
NA
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 20 February 1957; Nationality: DPRK
6.
JON MYONG GUK
a. Description:
Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria
b. AKA:
Cho’n Myo’ng-kuk
c. Identifiers:
Passport: 4721202031; Passport Date of Expiration: 21 Feb 2017; Nationality:
DPRK; DOB: 18 Oct 1976
7.
KANG MUN KIL
a. Description:
Kang Mun Kil has conducted nuclear procurement activities as a representative
of Namchongang, also known as Namhung.
b. AKA:
Jiang Wen-ji
c. Identifiers:
Passport: PS 472330208; Passport Date of Expiration: 4 July 2017; Nationality:
DPRK
8.
KANG RYONG
a. Description:
Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) Representative in Syria
b. AKA:
NA
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 21 August 1969; Nationality: DPRK
9.
KIM JUNG JONG
a. Description:
Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Vietnam
b. AKA:
Kim Chung Chong
c. Identifiers:
Passport: 199421147 Passport Date of Expiration: 29 Dec 2014; Passport:
381110042, Passport Date of Expiration: 25 Jan 2016; Passport: 563210184,
Passport Date of Expiration: 18 Jun 2018; DOB: 07 Nov 1966, Nationality: DPRK
10.
KIM KYU
a. Description:
Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) External Affairs Officer
b. AKA:
NA
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 30 July 1968, Nationality: DPRK
11.
KIM TONG MY’ONG
a. Description:
Kim Tong My’ong is the President of Tanchon Commercial Bank and has held
various positions within Tanchon Commercial bank since at least 2002. He has
also played a role in managing Amroggang’s affairs.
b. AKA:
Kim Chin-So’k, Kim Tong-Myong, Kim Jin-Sok; Kim, Hyok-Chol
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 1964; Nationality: DPRK
12.
KIM YONG CHOL
a. Description:
KOMID Representative in Iran
b. AKA:
NA
c. Identifiers:
DOB. 18 February 1962; Nationality: DPRK
13.
KO TAE HUN
a. Description:
Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative
b. AKA:
Kim Myong Gi
c. Identifiers:
Passport: 563120630; Passport Date of Expiration: 20 March 2018, D.O.B. 25 May
1972; Nationality: DPRK
14.
RI MAN GON
a. Description:
Ri Man Gon is the Minister of the Munitions Industry Department.
b. AKA:
n/a
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 29 October 1945; Passport number: PO381230469; Passport Date of
Expiration: 6 April 2016; Nationality: DPRK
15.
RYU JIN
a. Description:
KOMID Representative in Syria
b. AKA:
NA
c. Identifiers:
DOB: 07 August 1965; Passport Number: 563410081; Nationality: DPRK
16.
YU CHOL U
a. Description:
Yu Chol U is the Director of the National Aerospace Development Administration.
b. AKA:
n/a
c. Identifiers:
Nationality: DPRK
List
Update for Alias:
Ra, Kyong-Su (KPi.008) — New AKA: Chang, Myong Ho
Annex
II
Asset
Freeze (Entities)
1.
ACADEMY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENCE
a. Description:
The Academy of National Defense Science is involved in the DPRK’s efforts to
advance the development of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs.
b. AKA:
n/a
c. Location:
Pyongyang, DPRK
2.
CHONGCHONGANG SHIPPING COMPANY
a. Description:
The Chongchongang Shipping Company, through its vessel, the Chong Chon Gang,
attempted to directly import the illicit shipment of conventional weapons and
arms to the DPRK in July 2013.
b. AKA:
Chong Chon Gang Shipping Co. Ltd.
c. Location:
Address: 817 Haeun, Donghung-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate
Address: 817, Haeum, Tonghun-dong, Chung-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; IMO Number:
5342883
3.
DAEDONG CREDIT BANK (DCB)
a. Description: Daedong Credit Bank
has provided financial services to the Korea Mining Development Trading
Corporation (KOMID) and Tanchon Commercial Bank. Since at least 2007, DCB has
facilitated hundreds of financial transactions worth millions of dollars on
behalf of KOMID and Tanchon Commercial Bank. In some cases, DCB has knowingly
facilitated transactions by using deceptive financial practices.
b. AKA: DCB; AKA: Taedong Credit
Bank
c. Location: Address: Suite 401,
Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate
Address: Ansan-dong, Botonggang Hotel, Pongchon, Pyongyang, DPRK; SWIFT: DCBK
KKPY
4. HESONG TRADING COMPANY
a. Description: The Korea Mining
Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) is the parent company of Hesong Trading
Corporation.
b. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
5. KOREA KWANGSON BANKING CORPORATION (KKBC)
a. Description: KKBC provides
financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin
Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation.
Tanchon Commercial Bank has used KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting
to millions of dollars, including transfers involving Korea Mining Development
Corporation related funds.
b. AKA: KKBC
c. Address: Jungson-dong, Sungri
Street, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK
6. KOREA KWANGSONG TRADING CORPORATION
a. Description: The Korea Ryongbong
General Corporation is the parent company of Korea Kwangsong Trading
Corporation.
b. Address: Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang
District, Pyongyang, DPRK
7. MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY
a. Description: The Ministry of
Atomic Energy Industry was created in 2013 for the purpose of modernizing the
DPRK’s atomic energy industry to increase the production of nuclear materials,
improve their quality, and further develop an independent DPRK nuclear
industry. As such, the MAEI is known to be a critical player in the DPRK’s
development of nuclear weapons and is in charge of day-to-day operation of the
country’s nuclear weapons program, and under it are other nuclear-related
organizations. Under this ministry are a number of nuclear-related
organizations and research centers, as well as two committees: an Isotope
Application Committee and a Nuclear Energy Committee. The MAEI also directs a
nuclear research center at Yongbyun, the site of the DPRK’s known plutonium
facilities. Furthermore, in the 2015 Panel of Experts (POE) report, the POE
stated that Ri Je-son, a former director of the GBAE who was designated by the
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in 2009 for engagement
in or support for nuclear related programs, was appointed as head of the MAEI
on April 9, 2014.
b. AKA: MAEI
c. Address: Haeun-2-dong, Pyongchon
District, Pyongyang, DPRK
8. MUNITIONS INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT
a. Description: The Munitions
Industry Department is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile program.
MID is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic
missiles, including the Taepo Dong-2. The MID oversees the DPRK’s weapons
production and R&D programs, including the DPRK’s ballistic missile program.
The Second Economic Committee and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences — also
designated in August 2010 — are subordinate to the MID. The MID in recent years
has worked to develop the KN08 road-mobile ICBM.
b. AKA: Military Supplies Industry
Department
c. Location: Pyongyang, DPRK
9. NATIONAL AEROSPACE DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
a. Description: NADA is involved in
the DPRK’s development of space science and technology, including satellite
launches and carrier rockets.
b. AKA: NADA
c. Location: DPRK
10. OFFICE 39
a. Description: DPRK government
entity.
b. AKA: Office #39; AKA: Office No.
39; AKA: Bureau 39; AKA: Central Committee Bureau 39; AKA: Third Floor; AKA:
Division 39
c. Location: DPRK
11. RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL BUREAU
a. Description: The Reconnaissance
General Bureau is the DPRK’s premiere intelligence organization, created in
early 2009 by the merger of existing intelligence organizations from the Korean
Workers’ Party, the Operations Department and Office 35, and the Reconnaissance
Bureau of the Korean People’s Army. The Reconnaissance General Bureau trades in
conventional arms and controls the DPRK conventional arms firm Green Pine
Associated Corporation.
b. AKA: Chongch’al Ch’ongguk; KPA
Unit 586; RGB
c. Location: Address:
Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; Alternate Address: Nungrado, Pyongyang,
DPRK.
12. SECOND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
a. Description: The Second Economic
Committee is involved in key aspects of the DPRK’s missile program. The Second
Economic Committee is responsible for overseeing the production of the DPRK’s
ballistic missiles, and directs the activities of KOMID.
b. AKA: N/A
c. Location: Kangdong, DPRK
List Update for Alias: NAMCHONGANG TRADING CORPORATION (KPe.004)
— New AKA: Namhung Trading Corporation
Annex III
OMM Vessels
|
Ship
Name
|
IMO
Number
|
|
|
|
|
1. CHOL
RYONG (RYONG GUN BONG)
|
8606173
|
|
2. CHONG
BONG(GREENLIGHT)(BLUE NOUVELLE)
|
8909575
|
|
3. CHONG
RIM 2
|
8916293
|
|
4.
DAWNLIGHT
|
9110236
|
|
5. EVER
BRIGHT 88 (J STAR)
|
8914934
|
|
6. GOLD
STAR 3 (BENEVOLENCE 2)
|
8405402
|
|
7. HOE
RYONG
|
9041552
|
|
8. HU
CHANG (O UN CHONG NYON)
|
8330815
|
|
9. HUI
CHON (HWANG GUM SAN 2)
|
8405270
|
|
10. JH
86
|
8602531
|
|
11. JI
HYE SAN (HYOK SIN 2)
|
8018900
|
|
12. JIN
Tal
|
9163154·
|
|
13. JIN
TENG
|
9163166
|
|
14. KANG
GYE (PI RYU GANG)
|
8829593
|
|
15. MI
RIM
|
8713471
|
|
16. MI
RIM 2
|
9361407
|
|
17. O
RANG (PO THONG GANG)
|
8829555
|
|
18.
ORION STAR (RICHOCEAN)
|
9333589
|
|
19. RA
NAM 2
|
8625545
|
|
20.
RANAM 3
|
9314650
|
|
21. RYO
MYONG
|
8987333
|
|
22.
RYONG RIM (JON JIN 2)
|
8018912
|
|
23. SE
PHO (RAK WON 2)
|
8819017
|
|
24. SONGJIN
(JANG JA SAN CHONG NYON HO)
|
8133530
|
|
25. SOUTH HILL 2
|
8412467
|
|
26. SOUTH HILL 5
|
9138680
|
|
27. TAN CHON (RYONG GANG 2)
|
7640378
|
|
28. THAE PYONG SAN (PETREL 1)
|
9009085
|
|
29. TONG HUNG SAN (CHONG CHON
GANG)
|
7937317
|
|
30. GRAND KARO
|
8511823
|
|
31. TONG HUNG 1
|
8661575
|
Annex IV:
Luxury Goods
(a) Luxury watches: wrist, pocket, and other with a
case of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal
(b) Transportation items, as follows:
(1) aquatic recreational vehicles (such as personal
watercraft)
(2) snowmobiles (valued greater than $2,000)
(c) Items of lead crystal
(d) Recreational sports equipment
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